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Abstract
We study the response to the Charlie Hebdo shootings of Jan-
uary 7, 2015 on Twitter across the globe. We ask whether the
stances on the issue of freedom of speech can be modeled us-
ing established sociological theories, including Huntington’s
culturalist Clash of Civilizations, and those taking into con-
sideration social context, including Density and Interdepen-
dence theories. We find support for Huntington’s cultural-
ist explanation, in that the established traditions and norms
of one’s “civilization” predetermine some of one’s opinion.
However, at an individual level, we also find social context to
play a significant role, with non-Arabs living in Arab coun-
tries using #JeSuisAhmed (“I am Ahmed”) five times more
often when they are embedded in a mixed Arab/non-Arab
(mention) network. Among Arabs living in the West, we find
a great variety of responses, not altogether associated with the
size of their expatriate community, suggesting other variables
to be at play.
Introduction
On the 7th of January 2015 the Paris offices of the French
satirical weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo were assaulted by
two brothers, French citizens born to Algerian parents, who
killed 11 persons and injured 11 more. The brothers claimed
to belong to Al Qaeda’s branch in Yemen. Charlie Hebdo is
a controversial magazine, partly due to the paper’s highly
secularist, and even openly anti-religious, articles making
fun of Catholicism, Judaism and Islam. The terrorist attack
against Charlie Hebdo was therefore widely interpreted as
an attack against freedom of expression and freedom of the
press, core principles of liberal democratic societies.
The social media, and Twitter in particular, reacted im-
mediately upon the attack. The hashtags #CharlieHebdo
and #JeSuisCharlie (“I am Charlie”) became an explicit
endorsement of freedom of expression and freedom of the
press and travelled fast and wide in Twitter. Qualifying
or directly opposing this endorsement, other hashtags soon
followed: #JeSuisAhmed (“I am Ahmed”) and #JeNeSuis-
PasCharlie (“I am not Charlie”). The latter was used not
Copyright © 2016, Association for the Advancement of Artificial
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only by people who were against the editorial line of Char-
lie Hebdo for being offensive to Islam but also, paradoxi-
cally, by representatives of radical right parties as a state-
ment against the Islamization of Europe.
The objective of this paper is to understand the social fac-
tors that contribute to online individual behavior. In particu-
lar we use Charlie Hebdo as a case study of three prominent
sociological theories modeling attention and opinion, rang-
ing in the assumptions about the formation of individual’s
opinion:
• Clash of civilizations – “the great divisions among hu-
mankind (...) will be cultural” (Huntington and others
1993). Individuals’ opinions and behavior are determined
by the culture in which they are socialized. Cultures,
on the other hand, organize around different civilizations,
such as the Western Christian and the Islamic civiliza-
tions.
• Density theory – individuals’ opinions are influenced by
the socio-demographic and/or cultural density of their of-
fline social context. The amount of interaction between
Muslims and non-Muslims, both in the West and Mid-
dle East, as expat communities become integrated into the
cultural fabric of its host nation, may affect the opinion of
one about the other.
• Interdependence theory – individuals’ opinions are in-
fluenced by the structure of online interactions within
their social network. The personal connections the indi-
viduals have, including those online, may change the their
worldview.
The aim of this work is both to re-examine the above the-
ories in the context of culturally-charged online discussion,
and to better understand the actors within the online phe-
nomena of #JeSuisCharlie.
Modeling Opinion Formation
Scholars of political behavior have long demonstrated that
individual political behavior changes as a function of so-
cial context (Allardt and Pesonen 1967; Huckfeldt 2009a;
Huckfeldt 2009b; Przeworski 1974; Wright 1976). Studies
of voting behavior, for example, have shown that vote choice
is not the result of an individual decision taken in isolation
from the characteristics of the social context in which the
individual is embedded. As Przeworski put several decades
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ago: “In order to understand political behavior, it is nec-
essary to treat individuals within the context of their social
interactions” (Przeworski 1974).
Theories we chose are well-established in social science
community, and their use in big data analysis extends both
computational and social science fields.
We begin with a macro-scale, deterministic cultural ex-
planation offered by Huntingtons civilizational theory. In
the Clash of Civilizations seminal paper (Huntington and
others 1993), Samuel Huntington argues that “the fault lines
between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future”. A
civilization is defined as a cultural entity, the highest among
humans, and the broadest level of cultural identity. Religion
is a major civilizational component. Two of the major civi-
lizations discussed by Huntington are the Christian Western
civilization and the Islamic civilization. According to Hunt-
ington, the Islamic civilization is incompatible with demo-
cratic values such as freedom of speech and freedom of the
press. An individual’s opinion on the Charlie Hebdo attack
will therefore be determined by the civilization she belongs
to, irrespective of the offline social context and online struc-
ture of interactions:
[H1] Opinions expressed about the Charlie Hebdo shoot-
ings are divided along “civilizational” faultlines, with a
higher proportion of pro-free speech tweets by users in West-
ern Christian civilization countries, and a higher one of pro-
Muslim tweets by users in the Islamic civilization countries.
Clash of Civilizations theory has been previously tested in
international communications networks in both social media
and email by State et al. (State et al. 2015), who conclude
its continuing endurance: “a bottom-up analysis confirms
the persistence of the eight culturally differentiated civiliza-
tions posited by Huntington, with the divisions correspond-
ing to differences in language, religion, economic develop-
ment, and spatial distance”. Going beyond communication
volume, we test the Clash of Civilization theory by exam-
ining individuals’ behavior as captured from the usage of
different hashtags.
Next, we turn to meso-scale dynamics with Density the-
ory, which postulates that individual behavior is “density
dependent and hence varies as a function of aggregate pop-
ulation characteristics” (Huckfeldt 2009b). First applied in
the context of urbanization in 1938, Wirth uses density to
describe the behavioral pressures social heterogeneity puts
on individuals (Wirth 1938). These pressures continue to
be central to the study of opinion and behavior, including as
expressed online (see for example “Bowling alone but tweet-
ing together” (Antoci, Sabatini, and Sodini 2014) or “Online
social networks and trust” (Sabatini and Sarracino 2015)).
Accordingly, the reaction to the Charlie Hebdo attack
does not depend exclusively on individual beliefs or geo-
graphic distance, but also on the offline social context in
which the individual is embedded. Concretely, the propor-
tion of people from a different culture surrounding an indi-
vidual may prompt a shift in one’s beliefs and attitudes. The
prominence of Muslim diasporas in the Western countries
may prompt two possible reactions: (1) the heightened inter-
action with Muslim population provides a common ground
in Westerners for understanding and empathy, or (2) the ma-
jority feels threatened by increasing minority. Thus we pose
two hypotheses for Western users, reflecting the two alterna-
tives (with mirror theories possible for Muslim users):
[H2a] The higher the proportion of Muslims in the popu-
lation, the higher the proportion of pro-Islam tweets.
[H2b] The higher the proportion of Muslims in the popu-
lation, the lower the proportion of pro-Islam tweets.
Finally, the personal connections we have may contribute
the most to our view of the world. By interacting with others
on a daily basis we negotiate relationships in order to derive
some benefit, and in this process we change ourselves. In-
terdependence theory is a social exchange theory that pos-
tulates that people weigh costs to achieve the greatest ben-
efits out of their relationships (Thibaut and Kelley 1959).
Rewards may come from both similarities and differences in
the dyad, as long as both parties are equally able and willing
to provide rewards for others. Thus, we formulate the last
hypothesis:
[H3] Within mixed Arab/non-Arab networks, users are
likely to tweet similar content to that of their neighborhood.
Related Work
Recently, Twitter and other online media have been utilized
to re-examine longstanding sociological theories. Provid-
ing unprecedented scale, and capturing behaviors hereto-
fore unattainable by standard sociological methods, big so-
cial data initiated a new field of computational social sci-
ence (Lazer et al. 2009). Below we describe works on com-
munication and opinion formation most relevant to this pa-
per, and direct the reader to (Mejova, Weber, and Macy
2015) for a comprehensive view of the field.
Analyses of responses to salient political events on Twit-
ter have ranged from Occupy Wall Street protests (Conover
et al. 2013) and same-sex marriage debates (Zhang and
Counts 2015) in US, to, more internationally, Mexican drug
wars (De Choudhury, Monroy-Hernandez, and Mark 2014),
Ferguson unrest (Jackson and Foucault Welles 2015), and
the Arab Spring protests (Bruns, Highfield, and Burgess
2013; Lotan et al. 2011; Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer
2013). Although Twitter is often associated with social
movements, as Wolfsfeld et al. point out, “politics comes
first” (Wolfsfeld, Segev, and Sheafer 2013), and is followed
by discussion on social media. Due to the international na-
ture of social media, this discussion, Burns et al. state, is
often by the “outsiders looking in” (Bruns, Highfield, and
Burgess 2013). It is these “outsiders” – both in the West and
Middle East – who are the focus of our present work.
Among the theories we consider, Clash of Civilizations
has been revisited by State et al. (State et al. 2015) us-
ing Twitter, who found the clusters of countries in the in-
ternational communication network to resemble the “civ-
ilizations” defined by Huntington. Other works on in-
terpersonal interaction, including hashtag usage propaga-
tion (Romero, Meeder, and Kleinberg 2011), health behav-
ior (Abbar, Mejova, and Weber 2014), vote turnout (Bond et
al. 2012), and news (Kwak et al. 2010), use immediate user
#JeSuisAhmed #JeSuisCharlie
muslim years, year, old, remembering, outside, attackers, car-
toonists, while, guy, shot
jew, christian, frankdeleeuw, merry, jewish, russia,
christmas, customers, jews, zionists
islam love muhammad, war, isis, wrong, islamicstate, truth,
anti, obama, nd
christianity, judaism, islamism, bible, kkk, religionkills,
atheism, reform, teaches, teachings
freedom democracy, double, comes, support, liberty, religious,
offensive, insulting, women, without
free, democracy, includes, principle, cornerstone, prin-
ciples, trumps, limits, essential, speech
press insulting, values, law, called, liberty, line, double,
democracy, offensive, women
defenders, claiming, speech, slams, censor, while, prin-
ciple, defence, countries, advocate
terror protest, since, tomorrow, mosques, pictures, new, tag,
war, wake, days
terrorist, fatah, deadly, chechnya, terrorism, attacks,
savage, senegal, gatestoneist, warns
Table 1: Word associations produced by word2vec for #JeSuisAhmed and #JeSuisCharlie hashtag collections.
neighborhood to predict behavior, inadvertently challeng-
ing Interdependence theory, wherein social relationships are
negotiated for some mutual benefit. For example, (Abbar,
Mejova, and Weber 2014) model the health value of users
Twitter feed by considering the number of network connec-
tions they have who post unhealthy content. Fewer studies
have been done on an intermediate community-level scale.
Community socio-economic well-being has been studied
by (Quercia et al. 2012), who apply sentiment analysis to
tweets from London, and show a significant correlation be-
tween the Index of Multiple Deprivation and the “Gross
Community Happiness” score they define. We go a step fur-
ther, characterizing the mixing of communities, and the ef-
fect this mixing has on their opinions, as expressed on Twit-
ter. For both personal as well as larger scales, our work is
a contribution to the ongoing effort to re-examine existing
sociological theories in the sphere of social media.
Recently, hashtags concerning Charlie Hebdo, and specif-
ically “Je Ne Suis Pas Charlie” (“I am not Charlie”), have
been examined by Giglietto & Lee (Giglietto and Lee 2015),
who found a high proportion of retweets and image sharing,
with a unique practice of retweeting nothing but the hashtag
itself (in 2% of the cases). This hashtag, the authors con-
clude, is a “discursive device that facilitated users to form,
enhance, and strategically declare their self-identity”. In this
work, we attempt to uncover the mechanisms underlying
such self-identification.
Reactions to the Charlie Hebdo attack
Reactions to the Charlie Hebdo attack have clustered around
the following hashtags which we use in our study. We de-
scribe each and outline other prominent hashtags associated
with them:
#CharlieHebdo – Sympathy towards the victims of the
attack, general condemnation of the attack. It is associ-
ated with informational tags mentioning Paris, the car-
toonists killed, and the suspects. (In shorthand, #CH.)
#JeSuisCharlie (I am Charlie) – Endorsement of free-
dom of speech and freedom of the press under any circum-
stances. It is more focused on freedom, and the responses
to the event in form of the tributes, many of them draw-
ings of pens as symbols of writers, and especially popular
tweets by the urban artist banksy. (#JSC)
#JeNeSuisPasCharlie (I am not Charlie) – May con-
vey two meanings: Rejection of freedom of speech and
freedom of the press when the message is offensive to-
wards Islam. Alternatively, rejection of freedom of speech
for Muslims in Christian countries. It is associated with
prominent reporters as Max Blumenthal and Benjamin
Norton. (#JNSPC)
#JeSuisAhmed (I am Ahmed) – Reactions that differen-
tiate between Islam and terror; emphasis on the fact that
among those defending freedom of speech there are also
Muslims, such as Ahmed, one of the policemen killed
by the terrorists. It is associated with the murdered po-
liceman Ahmed, who was tweeted to be “protecting free
speech” or other french people. Note that this stance is not
necessarily in opposition to #JeSuisCharlie, in fact 76.5%
of those tweeting #JeSuisAhmed also mention #JeSuis-
Charlie (though only 6.17% do the opposite). (#JSA)
Throughout this project, we focus in particular on #Je-
SuisCharlie and #JeSuisAhmed – hashtags representing two
distinct positions. The former is a radical defense of free-
dom of speech; the latter is a defense of the compatibility
between Islam and freedom of speech (though in some cases
limited freedom). These positions are not altogether mutu-
ally exclusive, but they do emphasize two different, some-
times opposing, aspects of the same phenomenon.
To take a closer look at the stances associated with these
hashtags, we use word2vec (Mikolov et al. 2013), a com-
putational framework that learns a vector representation of
words by taking a text corpus as input. Table 1 lists the
words associated with a selection of topics. Both #JeSuis-
Charlie and #JeSuisAhmed hashtags connect freedom with
democracy. Clearly, freedom is understood by all as a demo-
cratic value. However, for #JeSuisAhmed users, freedom
is also attached to more negative meanings, such as offense
against Islam, whereas for #JeSuisCharlie users freedom is
treated as an essential principle that should not be trumped
by any other.
Data & Methodology
Western and Islamic “civilizations”
To compare the Western and Islamic cultures, we focus on
the 39 countries, 20 countries including Western Europe and
the USA, which represent the Western civilizational culture,
and 19 countries from the Middle-East, which represent (not
exhaustively) the Islamic civilizational culture. These coun-
tries are listed in Table 2, along with each country’s propor-
tion of Muslim population in parentheses (CIA 2010). The
two groups have a wide difference in the proportion of Mus-
lims, with most Middle Eastern countries having > 70% and
Western < 8%, with notable exceptions such as Cyprus (at
25.3%), which has a distinct population composition.
Region Country (Muslim population (%))
Middle
East (19)
Morocco (99.9), Iran (99.5), Tunisia (99.5),
Yemen (99.1), Iraq (99), Turkey (98), Algeria
(97.9), Palestine (97.6), Jordan (97.2), Libya
(96.6), Egypt (94.4), Saudi Arabia (93), Syria
(92.8), Oman (85.9), United Arab Emirates
(76.9), Kuwait (74.1), Bahrain (70.3), Qatar
(67.7), Lebanon (61.3)
Western
(20)
Cyprus (25.3), France (7.5), Netherlands (6),
Belgium (5.9), Germany (5.8), Switzerland
(5.5), Austria (5.4), Greece (5.3), Sweden (4.6),
United Kingdom (4.4), Denmark (4.1), Italy
(3.7), Norway (3.7), Luxembourg (2.3), Spain
(2.1), Ireland (1.1), Finland (0.8), Portugal
(0.6), Iceland (0.2), USA (0.9)
Table 2: Selected Middle Eastern and Western countries
(with % Muslim population).
Twitter data
Before focusing on the individuals within countries, how-
ever, we collect tweets concerning the Charlie Hebdo inci-
dent using two sources: (1) Nick Ruest’s collection of tweets
which track #JeSuisCharlie, #JeSuisAhmed, and #Char-
lieHebdo, and (2) a Topsy.com collection tracking #JeNe-
SuisPasCharlie and #JeSuisPasCharlie.
Nick Ruest collection. We use a collection created by
Nick Ruest1 , who has collected tweets that include one
of the following three hashtags – #JeSuisCharlie, #JeSu-
isAhmed, and #CharlieHebdo – from 2015-01-07 11:59:12
UTC to 2015-01-28 18:15:35 UTC using Twitter’s search
API.
We “hydrated” (i.e. collected metadata for) the released
tweet IDs2 using Twitter public API, collecting 11,367,987
tweets (7.1M tweets with #CharlieHebdo, 6.5M with #Je-
SuisCharlie, and 264,097 with #JeSuisAhmed) posted by
3,081,039 unique users (2M users for #CharlieHebdo, 2M
1http://goo.gl/fI0QPU
2http://dataverse.scholarsportal.info/dvn/dv/
nruest/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?globalId=hdl:
10864/10830
users for #JeSuisCharlie, and 169,598 users for #JeSu-
isAhmed). Although the volume of tweets is less than the
original, since some of the tweets no longer exist, aggregate
statistics are similar to what Nick Ruest has reported – for
example, in this dataset, 76.74% of tweets are retweets and
1.77% of them are replies, with the most retweeted tweets
having images.
The activity level of the users varies widely across our
dataset – up to the maximum of 35,418 tweets by one user,
with the median of 1 and the mean of 3.69. To remove ab-
normally active users, who are likely to be spammers, we
discard users who tweeted more than 148 times, which is the
99th percentile of the distribution. This filters out 0.1% users
(2,787) with 9% of total tweets (881,100) from the dataset.
Then to further focus on those users who show their stance
regarding the CharlieHebdo incident strongly and somewhat
unambiguously, we only consider users with two or more
tweets in this dataset, resulting in a dataset of 1,389,673
users with 8,796,872 tweets.
To map the tweets to their respective countries of ori-
gin, we geo-locate the data in two ways. First, we look at
whether the tweet is geo-tagged and, if it is, we use it as
user’s location. In a case where a user’s tweets are in differ-
ent countries, we discard these users to avoid ambiguity. If
geo-tagging is not available, then we apply Yahoo! Place-
Maker3 to the location field in their bio on Twitter. Yahoo!
PlaceMaker is a web service which, given a text, returns best
matched location. For example, with the sentence “I live in
New York”, it returns “New York, New York, USA”. The
service is especially suitable for our data, as it supports lan-
guages beyond English.
Among 1,389,673 users, we successfully located 688,651
(45,717 users from geo-tagged tweets and 642,934 Yahoo!
PlaceMaker)4. These users are mostly from North Amer-
ica and Europe – the top five countries are US, France,
UK, Spain and Canada. Note that we discard users with
two or more locations (e.g., India/Paris, Dubai/Paris) – 221
users when using geo-tagged tweets and 17,352 (2.6%) users
when using Yahoo! PlaceMaker.
Finally, among those located users, 464,176 are in the 39
countries of our interest. In the forthcoming analysis, we fo-
cus on these 464,176 users, who are engaged with the Char-
lie Hebdo shootings, have expressed an opinion on it, and
could be located geographically, along with their 3,030,558
tweets (1.37M of #CH, 1.62M of #JSC, and 42,029 of
#JSA). These users are mostly located in five countries, in
order of magnitude: France, United States, United King-
dom, Spain, and Italy.
We expand this collection by crawling the most recent
tweets (maximum of 3,200) of each of these users. By
detecting mentions in these tweets (handles of other Twit-
ter users), we then build an ego mention network for the
users in our dataset. We collect 932,003,251 tweets in total
and we extract 23,406,770 mentioned users in those tweets.
3https://developer.yahoo.com/boss/geo/
4We have 13,823 users who got located by both Geo-tagged
tweets and Yahoo PlaceMaker. For the 92.3% users (12,756), two
methods are resulted in the same location.
We attempt to locate these mentioned users using their geo-
tagged tweets and self-described location (as above) and
successfully find 4,326,045 users’ location (18.4%). Among
274,152,345 links between our seeding users to mentioned
users, 0.6% (1,779,086) of them are reciprocal links between
users who tweeted CH.
Topsy collection. We collect the tweets containing one
of the two hashtags not available in the Nick Ruest collec-
tion – #JeNeSuisPasCharlie (JNSPC) and #JeSuisPasCharlie
(JSPC), both versions of “I am not Charlie” – using Topsy5
from 7th to 28th January 2015. Topsy is a certified part-
ner of Twitter for offering social search and social analytics,
such as Twitter Oscar Index6 and Twitter political Index7.
Topsy indexes every public tweet and allows users to search
them by certain keywords since 20138. This means that our
analysis is based on the entire set of public tweets instead
of small-sized samples. While Tospy offers the public inter-
face to access to tweets even after it was acquired by Apple
in 2013, Apple finally shutdowns the service as of December
2015.
We initially gather 35,966 tweets (tweet id, screen name
of users, and text) from Topsy. Then using Twitter API, we
collect 32,315 tweets (30,638 (JNSPC) and 5,379 (JSPC))
with 21,276 users. We then filter out users who have high
activity level (512) and users who have only one tweet
(16,919). Among the 4,356 remaining users, 395 users are
live in one of 39 countries of our interest. We focus on these
395 users and their 1,404 tweets for the analysis. We then
crawl 945,762 recent tweets posted by these 395 users. Out
of 159,028 users mentioned in those tweets, 12.29% of users
(19,529) are located.
These tweets are coming from locations that are some-
what different from our previous dataset. The top 5 countries
where these users are located are France, Algeria, United
States, Morocco, and Belgium.
The normalized temporal volume (showing percentage of
total hashtag volume) of the final collection (after user ge-
olocation and selection) can be found in Figure 1, and a raw
volume can be found as an inset plot. The vast majority
of activity happens within 3 days of the event, with #Char-
lieHebdo dominating the volume. The use of #JeSuisAhmed
peaks on the day after the attack.
Arabic identification. As our hypotheses deal with
users’ religious identities, we need to differentiate the Mus-
lims from the non-Muslims among the users in our dataset.
Since Twitter users usually do not declare their religious
identities in their profiles, we proceed with the – admittedly
rough – assumption that Arabic speakers, or users with Ara-
bic names, are Muslim. All other names or languages are
non-Muslim. Considering that approximately 94% of Arabs
are Muslims (CIA 2010), the assumption can be reasonably
accepted. Also, it is worth to mention that Iran and Turkey
are Muslim countries (99.5% and 98% of populations are
5http://topsy.com/
6http://oscars.topsy.com/
7https://election.twitter.com/
8http://about.topsy.com/2013/09/04/
every-tweet-ever-published-now-at-your-fingertips
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Figure 1: Daily tweet volume mentioning each of four hash-
tags (#CH, #JSC, #JSA, and #JNSPC). Insert: original data
without user selection.
Muslims, respectively, as in Table 2), but they are non-Arab
countries. We thus exclude users from Turkey and Iran to
avoid bias in the experiments using Arab and non-Arab dis-
tinction.
We firstly detect any user who tweets in Arabic, has a
name in Arabic, or set their language on Twitter as Arabic.
To detect the language of each tweet, we use three widely-
used libraries for language detection, which are CLD2 (em-
bedded in Google Chrome)9, langid.py (Lui and Baldwin
2012), and LangDetect10, and mark language by simple ma-
jority voting. It is known that this ensemble approach con-
sistently outperforms any individual system, including Twit-
ter’s language metadata (VRL 2014). If the name is not in
Arabic, then we check it against a dictionary of 4,401 Arabic
names in English (2,160 male names, 2,151 female names,
and 100 neutral names), which we build using baby name
lexicons11. The list of names used in the analysis is avail-
able at 12.
In our seeding dataset, we find that 5.3% of users (23,924)
pass the above filters. Among them, 69.8% of users (16,705)
are detected by the name-based approach, while 27.0% of
users (6,469) are detected by their language use. Only 750
users are detected by both methods.
For the rest of the paper, we will use Arab/non-Arab dis-
tinction for the users identified via the above method, not to
confuse it with other sources of religious identity (such as
that identified by CIA Fact Book and listed in Table 2).
Language. The languages used in our collections are
shown in Table 3. For Non-Arab users, French is the
most used language at 47.93% of all tweets with English at
35.57%. For Arab users, English is the most used language
at 49.57% of all tweets, with French at 25.85%, and Arabic
at only 9.89%. The latter statistic is understandable, since
9http://blog.mikemccandless.com/2011/10/
accuracy-and-performance-of-googles.html
10https://github.com/shuyo/language-detection/
blob/wiki/ProjectHome.md
11http://www.searchtruth.com/baby_nameshttp:
//www.urduseek.com/names
12https://goo.gl/Nam1ts
Hashtag Language Arab Non-Arab
CharlieHebdo Arabic 11,846 (13.74%) 0 (0.00%)
English 44,316 (51.42%) 513,918 (40.45%)
French 17,479 (20.28%) 493,908 (38.87%)
Others 12,551 (14.56%) 262,750 (20.68%)
JeSuisCharlie Arabic 2,008 (3.94%) 0 (0.00%)
English 22,531 (44.16%) 461,233 (30.98%)
French 18,428 (36.11%) 832,313 (55.90%)
Others 8,060 (15.80%) 195,314 (13.12%)
JeSuisAhmed Arabic 207 (4.11%) 0 (0.00%)
English 3,702 (73.48%) 18,929 (53.66%)
French 824 (16.36%) 13,299 (37.70%)
Others 305 (6.05%) 3,050 (8.65%)
JNSPC Arabic 41 (15.77%) 0 (0.00%)
English 98 (37.69%) 272 (29.73%)
French 111 (42.69%) 547 (59.78%)
Others 10 (3.85%) 96 (10.49%)
Total Arabic 14,102 (9.89%) 0 (0.00%)
English 70,647 (49.57%) 994,352 (35.57%)
French 36,842 (25.85%) 1,340,067 (47.93%)
Others 20,926 (14.68%) 461,210 (16.50%)
Table 3: The fraction of tweets in different languages by
Arabs and non-Arabs. (Classified using pooled language de-
tection.)
the queries were made using French hashtags, and in latin
alphabet, which surely excluded those tweets written purely
in Arabic (for more on this limitation, see the Discussion
section).
The large amount of users classified as Arabs that use lan-
guages other than Arabic is also probably due to the fact
that the largest number of tweets are concentrated in coun-
tries like France, United Kingdom, and the USA. This means
that a lot of users with an Arab background living in these
countries are tweeting in English and French, not Arabic.
Results
In this section we present our findings regarding the three
posed theories modeling the formation of opinions ex-
pressed wherein.
Clash of civilizations theory
Under Huntington’s thesis, the major fault lines in post-Cold
War geo-politics lie along cultural and religious identities.
In this study, the users we consider can be roughly divided
as belonging to two “civilizations” – the Western Christian
civilization and the Islamic civilization. Huntington poses
that Muslims, by virtue of belonging to the Islamic civiliza-
tion, will be more wary of defending freedom of speech than
Westerners. Here we test this hypothesis.
[H1] Opinions expressed about the Charlie Hebdo shoot-
ings are divided along “civilizational” faultlines, with a
higher proportion of pro-free speech tweets by users in West-
ern Christian civilization countries, and a higher one of pro-
Muslim tweets by users in the Islamic civilization countries.
Table 4 shows the proportion in the use of hashtags by
users identified as Arab and all others (Non-Arab). Both
Hashtag Non-arab Arab Western Middle east
JSC 97.67 88.09 97.65 90.51
JSA 2.27 10.88 2.29 8.94
JNSPC 0.06 1.03 0.07 0.07
Table 4: Percentage of tweets mentioning each hashtag.
groups use the largely topical #CharlieHebdo hashtag, and
very little #JeNeSuisPasCharlie. However, the relative pro-
portion of #JeSuisCharlie to #JeSuisAhmed is strikingly dif-
ferent, with one #JeSuisAhmed to every 10 #JeSuisCharlie
for the Arab users, and one to 43 for non-Arab ones. Similar
distinction is evident when we segment users by geographi-
cal locations (Western vs. Middle East).
Thus, we find some support for H1, although both pop-
ulations use #JeSuisCharlie more than #JeSuisAhmed, and
this cannot be explained by the Clash of Civilizations theory.
The wordclouds in Figure 2 show how Non-Arab and Arab
users use #JeSuisCharlie, with Arabs mentioning Ahmed,
God, and solidarity while both focusing on freedom.
(a) #JeSuisCharlie by Non-
Arab
(b) #JeSuisCharlie by Arab
Figure 2: Wordclouds for #JeSuisCharlie collection by Non-
Arab vs. Arab users.
Density theory
Density theory claims that the population densities of cul-
turally diverse groups in the individual’s offline social con-
text are important factors in the formation of opinion. In
this case, population densities are characterized by the size
of groups sharing the same “civilizational” culture within
one country. Is it possible that a diaspora of Arabs in the
West, and Westerners in the Arab world, affects the un-
derstanding of and attitudes toward Charlie Hebdo event?
Such effects may be simultaneous and contradictory: on one
side, they could be promoting empathy and understanding
by co-habitation, on another, they could encourage hostility
to an increasingly visible minority (from the point of view
of Muslims in the Middle East or Westerners in the West)
or towards an unfriendly majority (from the point of view of
Muslims in Western countries or Westerners in the Middle
East). Two alternatives arise in the face of minority/majority
interactions (here, for Western users):
[H2a] The higher the proportion of Muslims in the popu-
lation, the higher the proportion of pro-Islam tweets.
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(c) Arab users
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(d) All users (western)
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(e) Non-Arab users (western)
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(f) Arab users (western)
Figure 3: The percentage of JSA tweets over JSA+JSC tweets by Muslim population of the country, comparing 3 different
groups: all users, non-Arab, and Arab. Arab countries are colored in red and non-Arab in blue. Due to Arab filter design,
Turkey and Iran are removed from figures b, c, e, and f.
[H2b] The higher the proportion of Muslims in the popu-
lation, the lower the proportion of pro-Islam tweets.
Mirror hypotheses can be posed for Arab users. However,
our conclusions are more sound for Western population due
to the languages of our dataset, so we focus on this group of
users.
Here, we take advantage of The World Factbook’s propor-
tion of Muslim residents, as described in Data Section. Fig-
ure 3(a) plots the percent of #JeSuisAhmed (#JSA) tweets
over the combined total of #JeSuisAhmed and #JeSuisChar-
lie (y-axis) against the proportion of Muslims in the country
(x-axis). Figure 3(d) shows a zoom of the bottom left corner
of Figure 3(a), where Western countries are clustered (ex-
cept Cyprus, which has 25.3% Muslim population).
To compare the behavior of Arab and non-Arab users (as
defined in Data Section), we present the two user popula-
tions in Figures 3(b,e) for non-Arab users and Figures 3(c,f)
for Arab ones. In these graphs, we exclude Turkey and Iran
to eliminate bias, as users from these countries are not Arabs
but are Muslims nevertheless.
Table 5 shows Pearson product-moment correlation r and
Spearman rank correlation coefficient ρ between the percent-
age of #JSA tweets and the percentage of Muslims in the
country’s population in various slices of data. As Figure 3(b)
shows, there is a clear positive correlation (Pearson r=0.845,
p < 0.001), suggesting that Westerners who live in Middle
Eastern countries tend to tweet more with #JSA than those
who live in the West. There is, therefore, a clustered divi-
sion along the two “civilizations” described by Huntington.
However, the story is more complicated when we go deeper
and pay attention to the social context.
According to the Clash of Civilizations theory, non-Arabs
(i.e. Westerners) living in the Middle-East should behave in
a similar way to non-Arabs living in the West; after all, they
are all non-Muslims and they belong to the Western “civ-
ilizational” culture. Figure 3(b), according to Huntington,
should show all countries clustered on the left bottom cor-
ner. The graph shows, on the contrary, that non-Arabs living
in the Middle East, where they are surrounded by large ma-
jorities of Muslims, are much more likely to use #JSA than
non-Arabs living in the West. A similar observation can be
made for Arabs in the West (which all should cluster at the
All countries Western Arab
Person (r) Spear. (ρ) r ρ r ρ
All users 0.745*** 0.698*** -0.004 0.136 0.064 -0.300
Non-Arab 0.845*** 0.740*** 0.021 0.130 0.193 -0.010
Arab 0.675*** 0.675*** -0.186 0.097 0.157 -0.022
Significance: p <0.0001 ***, p < 0.001 **, p < 0.01 *
Table 5: Pearson and Spearman correlations of % of JSA
tweets to the % of Muslims in the country.
top right of Figure 3(c), but do not).
If we now turn to users living in the West, we also see that
the density of the social context matters. For both non-Arabs
and Arabs the correlation is extremely weak (see “Western”
column of Table 5). However, Figure 3(d) seems to suggest
that the relationship between the number of #JSA hashtags
and the percentage of Muslims in the country might not be
linear, but concave downwards. At between 0 and 3.5% of
Muslims in the country, non-Arabs are more likely to use
#JSA the larger the number of Muslims that live in the coun-
try; after a tipping point of 3.5% of Muslims in the country,
however, non-Arabs are less likely to hashtag JSA the larger
the number of Muslims surrounding them. Therefore, the
Muslim minority helps non-Muslims to be more emphatic
as far as this minority is not too large. The tipping point at
which non-Arabs become less emphatic and more fearful of
the Arab point of view is approximately at 3.5% of Muslim
population. Italy would seem to be the only clear outlier of
this concave relationship.
To verify the robustness of these figures, we model this
behavior using a measure of religiosity (indication of how
important religion is to a country’s residents). Indeed, re-
ligiosity, as measured by Gallup in 200913, is highly cor-
related with the proportion of #JSA tweets at r = 0.7085.
However, when a linear regression is fitted using both reli-
giosity and rate of Muslim population, the effect of religios-
ity is lost.
Interdependence theory
Whereas density theory concerns the aggregate level of
countries, we now turn to the individual level of analysis, in
which individuals build interpersonal relationships which af-
fect both parties. Interdependence theory concerns the effect
of online interactions on the individual’s online behavior:
[H3] Within mixed Arab/non-Arab networks, users are
likely to tweet similar content to that of their neighborhood.
As mentioned in the Data & Methodology Section, we
build a mention network for each user in our dataset. This
network contains all users whose Twitter handles have been
mentioned in the tweets of our users. Those users were then
also labeled as Arab or not. These mentions signify a user’s
connection to, or at least awareness of, other Twitter users,
and in the case they are Arab, increased awareness of the
Arab point of view.
13http://www.gallup.com/poll/142727/
religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx
We divide users into two groups: (1) users who have not
mentioned any Arabs in their tweets at all (28,939, denoted
as “No Mentions”) and (2) users who have mentioned an
Arab user at least once (338,430, denoted as “Some men-
tions”). We then compare the use of #JeSuisAhmed between
the groups, and find that the mixed group uses #JSA more
than twice as much as the homogeneously non-Arab group,
with 3.61% compared to 1.31% likelihood, respectively. A
Welch’s t test confirms that the difference in two groups is
statistically significant (t44,164 = 38.80, p < 0.001).
l
0
5
10
15
No Arab mention >= 1 Arab mention
Pe
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 o
f J
SA
 tw
e
e
ts
 (%
) l Arab in Arab countriesArab in Non−Arab countries
Non−Arab in Arab countries
Non−Arab in Non−Arab countries
Figure 4: Mean percentage of JSA tweets for four user
groups in conditions with and without Arab mentions.
To understand better whether the mention network effect
is confounded by any offline effect, such as country of resi-
dence, we now look at four different user groups: a) Arabs
living in Arab countries, b) Arabs living in Non-Arab coun-
tries, c) Non-Arabs living in Arab countries, and d) Non-
Arabs living in Non-Arab countries and examine to what
extent the online factor plays a role. In Figure 4 we show
the behavior of each group. Mention network factor plays
a role for all user groups except Arabs in Arab countries,
which due to sparsity we do not consider (there are only 24
users, all of whom mention some Arab users).
Since the majority of users is in the “non-Arabs in non-
Arab countries” group, the result is similar to what we ob-
serve when we consider all users (see earlier paragraph).
The means of No Mention and Some Mentions are 1.26 and
3.03, respectively (t42,018 = 30.19, p < 0.001). The next
strongest relationship is for “Arabs in non-Arab countries”
user group, with the likelihood of tweeting #JSA almost
doubling from 5.37 to 9.86 (t320 = 3.62, p < 0.001). The last
group, “non-Arabs in Arab countries” also shows a strong
pattern, with the difference between 2.83 and 15.76 having
p < 0.001 (t72 = 6.56).
Overall, we observe that the personal mentions in users’
interactions do affect the likelihood of expressing an opin-
ion favorable to #JeSuisAhmed. Note, however, that the “of-
fline” distinction – that is, where the user lives – is a stronger
predictor of online behavior.
Among the 27.27M users, including the mentioned users,
our filters detect 4.8% (1,312,008) Arab users. We find that
the links in mention network are mostly to non-Arab Twitter
users – 90.07% links from non-Arabs and 5.54% links from
Arabs. Only 3.73% links mention Arab users (2.67% from
Person (p) Spearman (r)
All users 0.215*** 0.153***
Non-Arab users 0.208*** 0.130***
Non-Arab in Non-Arab countries 0.171*** 0.118***
Non-Arab in Arab countries 0.134*** 0.121***
Arab users 0.156*** 0.191***
Arab in Arab countries 0.134*** 0.122***
Arab in Non-Arab countries 0.171*** 0.118***
Significance: p <0.0001 ***, p < 0.001 **, p < 0.01 *
Table 6: Pearson and Spearman correlations of % of JSA
tweets to % of Arab mentions in the mention network by
different user groups.
non-Arabs and 1.06% from Arabs). Thus the discussion in
our dataset is focused on the Western world.
Table 6 shows how the percentage of Arab mentions in
one’s mention network is associated with the percentage of
JSA tweets. We find a positive relationship across all differ-
ent user groups, weak but statistically significant.
Discussion
The results of this study must be seen in the light of two
technical limitations, both of which would serve as impor-
tant future directions of research.
The data we have considered here has been collected
using French hashtags, and in Latin alphabet. Although
many other languages, including English, were captured,
this method has surely missed relevant Arabic content. Cap-
turing the multilingual response to international news is an
important technical challenge for the worldwide opinion
tracking community. Another challenge is the identifica-
tion of religious affiliation purely from online data. Auto-
matic classification, such as the one proposed by Nguyen &
Lim (Nguyen and Lim 2014), may provide access to users
whose religion does not statistically follow from their name
or language, as we have assumed in this research.
Above limitations aside, the insights in this study have
several implications for human-centric application design.
While it has been studied extensively in the political context,
our study is the first which empirically shows that exposure
to other views affects user behavior in the cultural context.
Diversity is one of the key elements for a healthy society, yet
there is much polarization in both online and offline worlds –
with echo chambers limiting the views of both sides (Gilbert,
Bergstrom, and Karahalios 2009). Our findings support the
design of more pluralistic discourse efforts.
As noted by (Giglietto and Lee 2015), “Je Suis...” hash-
tags aid users in self-identification as a part of a group.
This kind of behavior has been reported in various con-
texts (Chen, Sun, and Hsieh 2008). For instance, in on-
line games, guild (small group) members explicitly show
their guild names in their handle names (Nardi and Harris
2006). In a virtual world, expressing oneself and having
a group membership is vital to sustain online communities
and offer better user experience. The affordances for self-
identification, thus, are important for successful online com-
munities.
As we mentioned earlier, scholars have long worked on
understanding social responses to political events, espe-
cially on social media (Bruns, Highfield, and Burgess 2013;
Conover et al. 2013; Zhang and Counts 2015). Our work is
aligned with the study by Burns et al. in that it takes into
account the global characteristics of social media around
the Arab Spring (Bruns, Highfield, and Burgess 2013). As
their study shows information flow between Arabic and non-
Arabic user groups by looking into reply and retweets, our
work illustrates, instead, how such data could be used for
international-scale verification of existing hypotheses devel-
oped in social and political science.
Analyses described in this work, as in most social behav-
ior studies, must be interpreted within correlation is not
causation warning. The captured phenomena is likely in
part due to homophily, wherein more tolerant people would
connect to a more diverse sphere of friends. The next step,
then, is to simulate, or indeed perform, experimental evalu-
ation in order to verify the causal links between interaction
with diverse communities and opinion change. Social media
giants such as Facebook and Twitter are in a unique opportu-
nity to monitor the readership behaviors of their users, how-
ever a strict adherence to privacy and non-manipulation con-
siderations must be implemented (for such studies as (Bak-
shy, Messing, and Adamic 2015), for example).
Finally, the role of mass media may play a central stage in
the opinion formation and propagation in social media – an
important dimension for future study. Moreover, as (Lin and
Margolin 2014) show, in social media attention tends to con-
verge on few hashtags which signal the topic. Thus, more
fine-grained topic analysis may find stances in line with #Je-
SuisAhmed in the #JeSuisCharlie stream.
Conclusion
Our work presents a systematic application of sociological
opinion formation theories to the analysis of the Twitter re-
sponse to the Charlie Hebdo shootings of January 2015. The
theory of the Clash of Civilizations first seemed to be con-
firmed at face value by the data, but when we look deeper,
paying attention to the social context (i.e. the country and
its socio-demographic composition) and the structure of on-
line interactions between users (culturally mixed or cultur-
ally homogeneous), we see that Clash of Civilizations needs
to be rejected, or at least qualified, in favor of Density the-
ory and Interdependence theories. Culture – and religion as
a fundamental part of it – matters a great deal, as Huntington
argues, but it matters in much more subtle ways than those
advanced by the Clash of Civilizations theory.
Social media data makes it possible to model an indi-
vidual’s interaction with both mainstream and minority cul-
tures, allowing us to model individual behavior change. As
geo-political developments unfold, and greater number of
cultures will come in contact, this data will increasingly
present opportunities for verifying old and forming new the-
ories on opinion formation in pluralistic societies.
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